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Most scholars have missed the role of property in the U.S. regulation of insider 
trading.  Decades of scholarship have grappled with whether future iterations of 
the regulation would be improved by treating insider trading as a property issue.1  
                                                 
 + Assistant Professor at Michigan State University College of Law. I am grateful for helpful 
comments from and conversations with many scholars, including: John P. Anderson, Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Mitchell F. Crusto, Loletta Darden, Mihailis E. Diamantis, Jonathan Glater, Joan 
MacLeod Heminway, Jeremy Kidd, and Jonathan R. Macey. I also benefited from feedback 
received during presentations at the Tenth Annual John Mercer Langston Writing Workshop, the 
2019 Junior Faculty Forum at the University of Richmond, the New Scholars Workshop at the 
Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) 2019 Annual Conference, and several of 
Antonin Scalia Law School's Levy Workshops. 
 1. Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against 
Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 11 (1984) (encouraging a “new understanding of the fact 
that privileged corporate information is a valuable asset in the nature of a property interest”); Donna 
M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan 
Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1267 (1998) (noting that many legal scholars reject a property-
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Some scholarship relies on economic analysis aimed at determining which 
allocation of rights in information will generate the greatest efficiency or 
liquidity in U.S. securities markets.  Other scholarship attempts to reconcile the 
perceived incoherence or vagueness in the law using doctrinal analysis.  
However, almost everyone seems to miss the fact that under the classical theory 
officials have consistently predicated legal liability, in part, on the violation of 
the property rights of the information owner and have explicitly recognized the 
issuing corporation as the owner of the information. 
In 1961, in the first administrative case imposing liability for insider trading, 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) explained that the 
defendants were penalized for two reasons.  First, 
the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to 
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and 
not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent 
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information 
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.2 
By predicating liability in part on the violation of the issuing company’s 
exclusive use rights in inside information, the SEC identified a property 
principle as an animating feature of the doctrine.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
adopted the SEC’s two-part justification almost verbatim when it published its 
first insider trading decision in 1980.3  Moreover, despite eliminating the 
                                                 
rights rationale because “the goal of protecting property rights in secret information lies outside the 
zones of interest of the federal securities laws”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under 
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 40 (1993) (assessing 
whether transaction attorneys should be allocated a property right in deal information, and 
concluding that prohibiting such an allocation would protect “the client’s incentive to develop 
valuable information and…save the parties from engaging in costly and unnecessary 
negotiations”); Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 977 
(2014) (describing a property rationale as “a compelling normative approach to insider trading, but 
it lacks sufficient descriptive power”); Richard W. Jennings, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 
55 CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1234 (1967) (book review) (arguing that the prohibition is justified as a 
means of protecting the property rights of shareholders, who he describes as the ultimate owners of 
the information); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 
TEX. L. REV. 375, 436 (1999) (using a property rationale to describe insider trading as a species of 
“wrongful conversion,” and therefore supporting the prohibition on insider trading and rejecting 
the notion that shareholders’ are able to consent to the use of inside information in securities 
trading); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the 
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 314, 317–18, 321 (1981) (advocating the 
treatment of insider trading as a species of the law regulating business information and warns 
against allowing the doctrine to be pigeonholed as securities law); see generally Gary Lawson, The 
Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 727 (1988) (using a framework based on 
Aristotle’s moral theory and John Locke’s property theory to evaluate the practice of insider 
trading). 
 2. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (Nov. 9, 1961) (emphasis added). 
 3. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (stating that an insider’s duty to 
disclose or abstain from trading “arose from (i) the existence of a relationship affording access to 
inside information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of 
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“exclusive use” language, the Court continued to refer to the defendant’s 
unauthorized use of confidential business information when it last explained 
why liability is imposed in classical theory cases.4  The Court has previously 
stated that confidential business information “has long been recognized as 
property.”5 
As a consequence of missing the role of property in insider trading law, issues 
related to the legitimacy of the doctrine have been overlooked.  Many scholars 
have noted the ways in which insider trading doctrine departs from the expected 
features of a property regime.6  Several have noted that the inability of 
information owners to license inside information for trading in securities 
markets is a dramatic departure from the common elements of a property 
regime.7  Others have raised concerns that imposing controlling person liability 
on information owners looks a lot like blaming the victim of theft for his own 
victimization.8  Yet little has been said about how departures from property 
principles might undermine the authority of officials to impose liability for 
insider trading.9  If the violation of property rights is used as a justification to 
impose liability for insider trading, then it would be reasonable to expect 
common and long-standing property principles to at least partially control the 
scope and limits of the law. 
Scholars and lawmakers should be deeply concerned about the legitimacy 
issues raised by the departures from property principles in the law.10  When a 
law restricts the exercise of specific rights while being described as protecting 
                                                 
allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure.”) 
(emphasis added).   
 4. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997). Although the Court in O’Hagan 
does not explicitly identify the violation of rights of exclusive use and benefit, it did continue to 
describe the classical theory as in part premised on the insider’s use of information. Id.  
 5. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25–26 (1987) (citations omitted). 
 6. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice 
Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 S.M.U. L. REV. 1589, 1591 (1999) (arguing that 
“the SEC’s regulatory jurisdiction over insider trading meant that the problem was treated as a 
species of securities fraud rather than one of property rights”); Roberta S. Karmel, The Relationship 
Between Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibitions Against Insider Trading: Why A Property Rights 
Theory of Inside Information is Untenable, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 149, 173 (1993) (arguing that the 
property and other private law limitations on the prohibition articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Chiarella and Dirks were “simply inadequate to cover the fact patterns of cases in which some have 
been enjoined by the SEC or have even gone to prison”); see Nagy, supra note 1, at 1321; see also 
Kim, supra note 1, at 975–77. 
 7. See Kim, supra note 1, at 955; see also Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 36–37. 
 8. See JOHN P. ANDERSON, INSIDER TRADING: LAW, ETHICS, AND REFORM 108–112 
(2018); see also JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 
65–66 (1991) (concluding that “it is generally the employer who is harmed by the insider trading”). 
 9. But see, Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading 
after United States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J.  1482, 1512–1515 (2016) (questioning the legitimacy 
of Regulation FD and other gap fillers). 
 10. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63–79 (1969); Raff Donelson, Legal 
Inconsistencies, 55 TULSA L. REV (2019). 
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the same rights, it makes judges and enforcement officials look incompetent at 
best.  Worse, it suggests that some officials are hiding their true motives.  
Questions about the authority of insider trading law are more than abstract 
problems.  Targets of the prohibition face decades in prison and the confiscation 
of millions of dollars.  The longest criminal sentence imposed under the 
prohibition, eleven years, was given to Raj Rajaratnam in 2011.11  Rajaratnam 
was also fined ten million dollars.12  If his conviction was for violating a 
prohibition that premises liability on infringing on some party’s property rights 
in information, then it would make sense that he would have had the opportunity 
to raise a defense based on receiving the consent or ratification of the 
information owners.13  Without those options, insider trading decisions look 
more like the employment of vice laws or inalienability rules than the application 
of property doctrine.14 
Anyone concerned with the overarching public policy objective of fostering 
the rule of law should want the principles used to justify liability to help define 
the limits of the authority to impose liability.  Unless other valid and coherent 
principles of insider trading can explain the departures from property doctrine, 
courts, and enforcement officials should reconsider imposing liability for the 
practice.  If valid and competing principles do exist in the doctrine, then they 
should be clarified. 
With these concerns in mind, Part I describes the relevant elements of the 
federal insider trading regime.  The analysis includes a discussion of the 
difference between the classical theory and the misappropriation theory of 
insider trading liability, as well as the requirements of tipper and tippee liability.  
Part II demonstrates that when described as a means of remedying fraud, the 
prohibition of insider trading has always relied in part on the violation of some 
party’s property rights in order to impose liability.  In its first fraud-based insider 
trading case, the SEC laid out a legal test that premises liability in part on the 
fact that a trader makes use of “information intended to be available only for a 
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.”15  The U.S. 
Supreme Court later adopted this legal test in Chiarella.16  This property-based 
justification only became more prominent over time, with the introduction of the 
                                                 
 11. United States v. Rajaratnam, No. S-2:09 Cr. 01184, 2011 WL 6259591, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 20, 2011). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§ 892–892D, 896–900 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) 
(Division 12 of the Restatement categorizes consent and discharge as two of several defenses 
applicable to all tort claims). 
 14. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 3 (1965) (discussing and 
ultimately rejecting the proposition that unless we want to equate ‘religious sin’ and ‘crime,’ then 
“there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, 
not the law’s business.”); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092–1093 (1972). 
 15. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 912. 
 16. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 241–42 (1980). 
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misappropriation theory of liability.  Part III explores the scholarship that has 
either advocated for or opposed a greater reliance on property principles in future 
iterations of the U.S. regulation of insider trading.  The analysis will show that 
many accept an unnecessarily strong distinction between property doctrine and 
other doctrinal areas in American law. 
Part IV provides an overview of the implications of property principles 
consistently animating insider trading law.  First, this Section will provide a 
detailed discussion of the issues raised by the failure to adhere to the long-
standing elements of a property regime, focusing on the constitutional and 
statutory interpretation problems that emerge as a result.  Second, the clear 
reliance on property doctrine and the failure to adhere to property principles 
suggests potential explanations for the incoherence in insider trading doctrine 
described by many scholars and enforcement officials.17  If the other principles 
animating insider trading doctrine are not compatible with property principles, 
the tensions between these principles may be the cause of the ambiguity in the 
law.  Third, the existence of property principles in the law provides a clear path 
forward for legal reform.  Either lawmakers or courts can bring the doctrine into 
greater harmony with long-standing property principles, or they can clearly 
identify and prioritize the competing principles in the doctrine. 
The discussion of the implications of the property principles animating the 
doctrine in Part IV will hopefully act as a starting point for future scholarship 
and policy analyses. 
I.  THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 
The first thing to note about the federal prohibition against insider trading is 
that the name of the prohibition is misleading.  Federal law prohibits much more 
than trading by insiders.  The anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 
and the Exchange Act of 1934 are both used to penalize employees, independent 
contractors, and other agents of the company whose shares are being traded 
(insiders), as well as the agents or fiduciaries of a source of information 
unrelated to the company whose shares are being traded (outsiders).  In addition, 
Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, which prohibits short-swing profits, 
penalizes not only directors and officers (insiders), but also principal 
stockholders (outsiders), without any proof that the stockholder’s ownership 
position led to access to inside information.18  The second thing to note is that 
                                                 
 17. See Kim, supra note 1, at 949 (“To counter serious doctrinal instability and to answer 
persistent normative skepticism, we need a better theory of insider trading law.”); ANDERSON, 
supra note 8, at 3 (Describing the “American insider trading enforcement regime [as] broken,” 
Anderson argues that the uncertainty in the law “directly impacts shareholder value and leaves 
market players at the mercy of prosecutorial caprice.”); see also Nagy, supra note 1; Strudler & 
Orts, supra note 1; Macey, supra note 1; see also Preet Bharara & Robert J. Jackson Jr., Insider 
Trading Laws Haven’t Kept Up With the Crooks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/opinion/sec-insider-trading-united-states.html. 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012). 
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the prohibition of insider trading is justified and expressed through several 
statutory provisions and SEC rules. 
A.  Short-Swing Profits: Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act  
The provision that looks most like an explicit attempt by Congress to regulate 
insider trading is Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act.19  This provision aims to 
prevent “the unfair use of information which may have been obtained” by a 
company’s directors, officers and principal stockholders20 by prohibiting short-
swing profits.21  Section 16(b) defines “short-swing profits” as any profits 
generated by the purchase and sale or by the sale then purchase of securities, if 
those corresponding trades happened in the span of less than six months.22  
Section 16(b) allows a civil action to be brought for the disgorgement of any 
short-swing profits earned by a company’s directors, officers, or principal 
stockholders.23  The only parties recognized as having standing in a Section 
16(b) civil action are the company that issued the traded shares or the 
shareholders of that company.24  Whether or not the party bringing the suit is the 
company itself or one of the shareholders, the disgorged profits are given to the 
company.  However, Section 16(b) does not authorize the SEC to bring 
enforcement actions under the provision.25 
B.  Fraud: Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act, and Rule 10b-5 
When scholars discuss the prohibition of insider trading, they are most often 
discussing an application of the anti-fraud provisions of U.S. federal securities 
law.26  io are the broad anti-fraud provisions generally used to support imposing 
legal liability for insider trading. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act makes it: 
unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities…(1) to 
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain 
money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact 
or any omission to state a material fact…or (3) to engage in any 
                                                 
 19. Richard J. Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights, 48 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 79, 82 (1987) (describing Section 16(b) as “Congress’ specific response to the problem of 
insider trading”); see also ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 27 (describing Section 16(b) as “the only 
provision of the Exchange Act that explicitly addresses insider trading”). 
 20. A principal stockholder is defined in Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act as “the beneficial 
owner of more than 10 percent of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) 
which is registered pursuant to section 12.”  Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND POLICY 226 (2014). 
 26. Id. at 1–2. 
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transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.27 
SEC Rule 10b-5 makes it: 
unlawful for any person…(a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact…or (c) [t]o engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.28 
Rule 10b-5 was authorized under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and was 
modeled on Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.29  The important difference 
between the two provisions is that the language of Section 17(a) of the Securities 
Act limits liability to the context of an offer or sale and limits the harm 
recognized to those involving “a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”30  Rule 
10b-5 covers fraud aimed at inducing either purchases or sales, and the rule 
contains no language limiting liability to those who deceive or defraud a buyer 
or seller.31  The broader application of Rule 10b-5 likely explains why it 
dominates civil and criminal actions aimed at penalizing insider trading.32  
However, it is important to remember that the prohibition also relies on 
Securities Act 17(a).  In addition to the SEC citing Section 17(a) of the Securities 
Act in Cady, Roberts,33 the first modern insider trading case, the SEC also relied 
on the provision in Dirks v. S.E.C. in 1983.34  Because neither Section 17(a) of 
the Securities Act, nor Rule 10b-5, explicitly prohibit insider trading, two 
theories have developed to justify the prohibition: the classical theory and the 
misappropriation theory.  In addition, courts have developed a doctrine to find 
liability for tippers and tippees of material nonpublic information. 
The Supreme Court gave the classical theory its final form in the case of 
United States v. O’Hagan.35  The Court in O’Hagan describes the classical 
theory as follows: 
Under the “traditional” or “classical theory” of insider trading liability, 
[Section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated when a corporate insider 
trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, 
nonpublic information.  Trading on such information qualifies as a 
“deceptive device” under [Section] 10(b)…because “a relationship of 
                                                 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012). 
 28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012) (emphasis added). 
 31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 
 32. Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1376–77 (2009). 
 33. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908 (Nov. 9, 1961). 
 34. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 35. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 642 (1997). 
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trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation 
and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by 
reason of their position with that corporation.”  That relationship, we 
recognized, “gives rise to a duty to disclose [or to abstain from trading] 
because of the ‘necessity of preventing a corporate insider 
from…taking unfair advantage of…uninformed…stockholders.’”  
The classical theory applies not only to officers, directors, and other 
permanent insiders of a corporation, but also to attorneys, accountants, 
consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a 
corporation.36 
The Supreme Court first considered the misappropriation theory in 
Chiarella,37 and gave the theory its stamp of approval in O’Hagan.38  The Court 
in O’Hagan begins by explaining that the language of Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act does not limit liability to those who engage in the “deception of a 
purchaser or seller,” but also reaches any deceptive device used “in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security.”39  The Court then explains the 
misappropriation theory as follows: 
The “misappropriation theory” holds that a person commits fraud “in 
connection with” a securities transaction, and thereby violates 
[Section]  10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential 
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed 
to the source of the information….Under this theory, a fiduciary’s 
undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase 
or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, 
defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information.  In lieu 
of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company 
insider and purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the 
misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-
trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to 
confidential information.40 
Note that under both the classical theory and the misappropriation theory, 
disclosure is a defense against liability.41 
Finally, the tipper and tippee doctrines that have developed as courts have 
applied Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section (10)(b) of the Exchange Act, 
and Rule 10b-5 to insider trading creates liability for those individuals not 
obviously covered by the classical or misappropriation theories.42  When a 
fiduciary covered under the classical or misappropriation theory (a tipper) 
                                                 
 36. Id. at 651–52 (internal citations omitted). 
 37. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 237 n.21 (1980). 
 38. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650. 
 39. Id. at 651 (internal quotations omitted). 
 40. Id. at 652. 
 41. Id. at 651–52, 655. 
 42. Id. at 697–98. 
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discloses information to someone not covered under either theory (a tippee), 
liability will be imposed on the tipper and tippee, if the disclosure constitutes a 
breach of duty.  In Dirks v. S.E.C., the U.S. Supreme Court stated that to 
determine if there has been a breach of duty “requires courts to focus on 
objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal 
benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit 
that will translate into future earnings.”43  In addition to those circumstances in 
which the tipper receives an explicit pecuniary gain, the Court declared that 
“elements of [a breach of] fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic 
information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information 
to a trading relative or friend.”44 
C.  Tender Offers and Nonpublic Information: Section 14(e) of the Exchange 
Act and Rule 14e-3 
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act was added as a result of Congress passing 
the Williams Act, which was aimed at regulating tender offers for publicly 
traded securities.45  Section 14(e) authorizes the SEC to create “rules and 
regulations [that] define [which] acts and practices [are] fraudulent, deceptive, 
or manipulative.”46  As a result, the SEC created Rule 14e-3, which defines 
anyone other than the offeror trading on nonpublic information about an 
impending tender offer as a “fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or 
practice within the meaning of section 14(e).”47  Rule 14e-3 also makes it 
unlawful for tender offerors to “communicate material, nonpublic information 
relating to a tender offer to any other person under circumstances in which it is 
reasonably foreseeable that such communication is likely to result in” trading on 
nonpublic information about an impending tender offer.48 
D.  Remedies for Private Plaintiffs: Section 20A of the Exchange Act  
In 1988, Congress enacted Section 20A of the Exchange Act49 in response to 
a circuit split over the question of whether a private plaintiff could recover when 
another person violates the prohibition on insider trading.50  Because the federal 
                                                 
 43. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983). 
 44. Id. at 664. 
 45. Jonathan G. Katz, SEC Interpretation: Commission Guidance on Mini-Tender Offers and 
Limited Partnership Tender Offers, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jul. 31, 2000), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-43069.htm. 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012). 
 47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2018). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–704, 102 
Stat 4677. 
 50. LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES REGULATION 549–50 
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 9th ed. 2018) (“Legislative history cited with approval the [Shapiro] 
opinion discussed in Fridrich.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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prohibition is most often justified under the anti-fraud provisions of securities 
regulations, many courts held plaintiffs responsible for proving all of the 
elements of fraud recognized in Rule 10b-5 civil actions before a plaintiff could 
recover.51  These elements include reliance, which courts describe as providing 
“the requisite causal connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a 
plaintiff’s injury.”52  Some courts, as in the case of Fridrich v. Bradford,53 
determined that in the context of trading over an impersonal exchange, it was 
almost impossible to prove that the act of one party trading with material 
nonpublic information could have been relied upon by a second party who had 
no interaction with the first. 
Although in line with the reasoning in pre-SEC state court decisions,54 the 
court in Fridrich explicitly rejected the reasoning of the court in Shapiro v. 
Merrill Lynch,55 which determined that “the Supreme Court eliminated proof of 
reliance as a prerequisite to recovery in a 10b-5 case involving nondisclosure.”56  
In response to this circuit split, Congress added Section 20A to the Exchange 
Act, which—instead of proof of reliance—requires proof that a plaintiff traded 
contemporaneously with and in opposition to a party engaged in insider 
trading.57  A defendant’s liability to all potential plaintiffs is limited to the gross 
profit realized or loss avoided by the violator.58  In addition, a defendant’s 
potential liability to private plaintiffs is reduced by any amount already 
disgorged by the SEC or the Department of Justice in a government enforcement 
action.59  However, Section 20A of the Exchange Act does not prohibit or restrict 
insider trading; it only creates standing for private parties who trade 
contemporaneously with someone who trades in violation of some other 
provision barring insider trading to recover from the violator.60 
Now, compare Section 20A of the Exchange Act to Section 16(b) of the 
Exchange Act.  Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act only gives the issuer or 
current shareholders standing to sue for a violation of the provision, and only 
allows the issuer to recover the profits disgorged from officers, directors, or 
principal stockholders.61  Section 20A of the Exchange Act is indifferent to a 
plaintiff’s position as shareholder or non-shareholder both before and after the 
                                                 
 51. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
 52. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). 
 53. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318–19 (6th Cir. 1976). 
 54. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933). 
 55. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), 
aff’d, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 56. Id. at 275 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972)). 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2012). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–704, § 
5, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680–81 (1988).  
 61. 15 U.S.C § 78p (2012). 
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prohibited transaction.62  The salient factor is whether the plaintiff traded 
contemporaneously with the defendant.63  Further, it is unlikely (though not 
impossible) that an issuer will become a plaintiff in a Section 20A action, since 
issuers seldom have less material nonpublic information when trading with 
insiders.64  As a result, the parties with standing to sue and recover damages 
under the only clear restriction on insider trading created by Congress, Section 
16(b), are completely different than the parties able to sue and recover damages 
under Section 20A. 
II.  THE ROLE OF PROPERTY IN THE REGULATION 
What is the role of property in the prohibition of insider trading?  In short, the 
SEC and federal courts rely on property to justify imposing liability for insider 
trading.  As this Section will demonstrate, the SEC and federal courts (1) cite 
statutes aimed at the protection of property rights and (2) identify the violation 
of some party’s property rights in inside information when imposing liability for 
insider trading.  The most explicit reliance on property principles can be seen in 
the application of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act to prohibit insider trading.  Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act 
makes it unlawful to use material misrepresentations “to obtain money or 
property…in the offer or sale of any securities,”65 and Exchange Act Rule 10b-
5 is modeled on Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.  In applying these provisions 
under the misappropriation theory, several courts explicitly call the information 
in question the property of the source of the information.  In applying these 
provisions under the classical theory, the SEC in Cady, Roberts and several 
courts in other cases claim that the information obtained by insiders was 
information only intended for the benefit of the company.  This invocation of 
the exclusive use principle explicitly identifies the violation of the security 
issuer’s property rights in confidential business information as a premise for 
insider trading liability. 
A more implicit reliance on property principles can be found in the effects of 
eliminating the need for enforcement officials or civil plaintiffs to prove reliance 
or intentional inducement in order to make defendants face liability.  Because 
the doctrine eliminates the need to show an interference with a plaintiff’s liberty 
interest to impose liability, federal U.S. insider trading doctrine may place 
greater reliance on the violation of some party’s property rights when compared 
to common law fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent nondisclosure 
doctrines. 
                                                 
 62. § 5, 102 Stat. at 4680–81. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  As an exception to this expectation, consider that some of the defendants in Texas 
Gulf Sulfur were officers who accepted stock options from the issuer without first disclosing the 
ore find in Canada.  See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 856–57 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 65. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012). 
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A.  Reliance on Property-Based Statutes and Rules 
When enforcement officials and federal courts cite the anti-fraud provisions 
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act as giving them the authority to 
prohibit insider trading, they are explicitly invoking the property-protecting 
functions written into those provisions.  Although Section 17(a) of the Securities 
Act was enacted in May 193366 and Rule 10b-5 was adopted in December 
1948,67 the first enforcement action applying these provisions to insider trading, 
In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,68 did not occur until 1961.  As outlined in Section 
I.A. above, Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act makes it unlawful to use 
material misrepresentations “to obtain money or property” in the offer or sale of 
any securities.  Subsection (a)(2) is one of three subsections of Section 17(a) of 
the Securities Act.  In Cady, Roberts the SEC claimed that the three main 
subdivisions of Section 17(a) are “mutually supporting rather than mutually 
exclusive.  Thus, a breach of duty of disclosure may be viewed as a device or 
scheme, an implied misrepresentation, and an act or practice, violative of all 
three subdivisions.”69  To draw this conclusion, the SEC followed the lead of the 
Delaware district court in Speed v. Transamerica Corp., which made the same 
claim about the interrelated nature of all three subsections of Exchange Act Rule 
10b-5.70 
Recall that Rule 10b-5 was modeled on Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.  
Although Rule 10b-5 does not contain the term “property,” it is reasonable to 
conclude that the concept is captured by the language restricting the application 
of the rule to “the purchase or sale of any security,” because securities are a 
species of property.71  Similar reasoning provides additional support for the 
conclusion that liability under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act is limited to 
cases that involve the violation of some party’s property rights, because that 
provision is limited to cases involving the “offer or sale of any securities.”72  
This explicit property language in the anti-fraud provisions of U.S. securities 
                                                 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012). 
 67. Rules and Regulations under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 Fed. Reg. 8177, 8183 
(Dec. 22, 1948). 
 68. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 907 (Nov. 9, 1961). 
 69. Id. at 913. 
 70. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951). 
 71.   Rules and Regulations under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 Fed. Reg. at 8183.  
The Deleware Code explicity states, “[t]he shares of stock in every corporation shall be deemed 
personal property.”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 159 (West 2019).  After describing an equity investor’s 
share interests in a corporation as distinct from the property legally owned by the corporation itself 
in every jurisdiction, Allen et al. describe each share as an investor’s “personal legal property.”  
ALLEN, ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 99, (3rd 
ed. 2009). 
 72. 15 U.S.C. § 77q. (2012). 
2020] Missing the Role of Property in Insider Trading Regulation 221 
law is in harmony with the view of scholars who describe property as defining 
“the entitlements people…can sue in tort in order to protect.”73 
The next two subsections of this Article demonstrate how the case law based 
on Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 continue to identify the violation of property 
rights as a partial justification of legal liability. 
B.  Reliance on Property in Insider Trading Case Law 
The misappropriation theory of liability comes later in the history of insider 
trading jurisprudence.  However, it is useful to consider misappropriation cases 
first because they explicitly cite the violation of some party’s property rights in 
breach of a fiduciary duty as the justification for legal liability.  The Court in 
O’Hagan explains that liability will be imposed under the misappropriation 
theory when “a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s 
information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and 
confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information.”74 
The Court elaborates that a “company’s confidential information qualifies as 
property to which the company has a right of exclusive use; the undisclosed 
misappropriation of such information constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement.”75 
It is noteworthy that the Court views insider trading under the 
misappropriation theory as analogous to embezzlement and not conversion.  A 
person can commit conversion against a stranger. However, the Court reminds 
readers that embezzlement entails “the fraudulent appropriation to one’s own 
use of the money or goods entrusted to one’s care by another.”76  Referencing 
embezzlement and not conversion reminds us that even under the 
misappropriation theory of liability concerns about the violation of property 
rights are inextricably tied to concerns about fiduciary obligations. 
The explicit role of property under the misappropriation theory of liability is 
widely acknowledged by scholars.77 Less discussed is the connection that courts 
make between property rights and fiduciary obligations in these cases.  
However, recognizing that connection in misappropriation theory cases makes 
it easier to recognize the reliance on property to justify the classical theory of 
liability.78  After rejecting the equal access rational, the Court in Chiarella 
explained that nondisclosure prior to securities trading is fraudulent only when 
an insider trades in violation of “a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and 
                                                 
 73. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: 
PROPERTY 1 (2010). 
 74. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
 75. Id. at 643. 
 76. Id. at 654 (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987)). 
 77. See Nagy, supra note 1, at 1265–66. 
 78. This is true despite the language quoted above coming from the portion of the Carpenter 
opinion grappling with the application of the mail and wire fraud statutes, instead of those sections 
dealing with the application of securities laws. 
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confidence.”79  This declaration has led many scholars to conclude that the 
classical theory of liability is either solely or fundamentally justified by a breach 
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.  However, the next few paragraphs show how 
concerns about a breach of the duty of loyalty in classical theory cases is always 
linked to concerns about property rights. 
The breach of fiduciary duty used to justify liability in classical theory cases 
is derivative of some party’s property rights in confidential business 
information.  Beginning with the SEC’s administrative release on Cady, Roberts, 
a long line of classical theory cases describe the nonpublic information involved 
as only available for the use of the issuing company.  In explaining the principles 
that allow the prohibition of insider trading to extend beyond classical insiders, 
the SEC states that the obligation rests in part on “the existence of a relationship 
giving access . . . to information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.”80  Several federal courts 
have repeated this test for liability, which identifies (1) making personal use of 
(2) information received through certain kinds of relationships (3) when that 
information was solely available for the benefit of the corporate entity.  This test 
was repeated by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Texas Gulf Sulfurs81 and 
by the Supreme Court in Chiarella.82 
Describing inside information as “available only for a corporate purpose and 
not for the personal benefit of anyone” is similar to the language used by the 
Court in Carpenter when it describes business information as “a species of 
property to which the corporation has the exclusive right and benefit.”83  The 
statement also resembles Merrill and Smith’s description of ownership as 
identifying when someone “has the right to exclude others’ use of the thing and 
. . . has the right to use the thing.”84  These similarities support the conclusion 
that the SEC and federal courts recognize that liability for insider trading under 
the classical theory is predicated in part on the violation of the issuing company’s 
property rights. 
The Supreme Court’s most recent statement of classical theory liability does 
not explicitly mention a violation of exclusive use rights.85  This makes the role 
                                                 
 79. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (“[O]ne who fails to disclose material 
information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty 
to do so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has information ‘that the other [party] is 
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between 
them.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976))). 
 80. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (Nov. 8, 1961) (emphasis added). 
 81. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 82. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 (internal citations omitted) (“The Commission emphasized that 
the duty arose from (i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information 
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate 
insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure.”). 
 83. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987). 
 84. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 76, at 4–5.  
 85. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643 (1997). 
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of property less obvious, but no less relevant.  In O’Hagan, the Court explains 
that liability is imposed under the classical theory  “when a corporate insider 
trades in his corporation’s securities on the basis of material, confidential 
information he has obtained by reason of his position.”86  Consider that the 
Supreme Court has stated that confidential business information “has long been 
recognized as property.”  This supports viewing the most recent statement of 
classical theory liability as imposing liability when an insider (1) makes personal 
use of (2) information meant for the sole benefit of the corporate entity (3) if the 
information is received through certain kinds of relationships. 
Further obscuring the reliance on a violation of the issuer’s property rights in 
information, the Court in O’Hagan does not describe the insider’s duty to 
disclose as arising out of a relationship between the insider and the company. 
Instead, the Court states that the duty arises out of “a relationship of trust and 
confidence between the corporation’s shareholders and the insider.”87 However, 
as explained in Section II.C. below, it makes sense to view any fiduciary 
obligations that insiders owe to shareholders as arising out of shareholders’ 
equitable title to the information in which the issuer holds legal title.88 
C.  Reliance on Property in Other Misrepresentation or Nondisclosure Cases 
The role of property in common law fraudulent misrepresentation and 
fraudulent nondisclosure cases provides an interesting point of comparison.  In 
many ways, both the statutes relied on for authority and the case law explaining 
the prerequisites of liability for insider trading place a greater emphasis on 
property rights than the common law doctrines of misrepresentation and 
nondisclosure resulting in pecuniary loss.  According to the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, in addition to remedying the interference with a person’s 
rights to “money or property,”89 common law misrepresentation and 
nondisclosure doctrines seem equally if not more focused on addressing an 
interference with the liberty interests of the defrauded party.  The concern for 
liberty interests is shown by the fact that several of the elements in the legal tests 
for liability under these doctrines are related to the defendant inducing the 
plaintiff to take or avoid some action.  Of the five elements required for 
fraudulent misrepresentation described in the Restatement, three relate to the 
actions or inactions of the plaintiff.  Expectation of inducing conduct,90 
justifiable reliance,91 and causation92 each limit the defendant’s liability to harm 
caused by the plaintiff’s actions or inactions that were the result of or intended 
                                                 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See infra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
 89. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972), aff’d, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). 
 91. Id. § 537. 
 92. Id. § 546 cmt. a. 
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from the defendant’s misrepresentation.  Showing a similar concern for liberty 
interests, liability for nondisclosure is imposed under common law when a 
person fails to disclose facts he knows “may justifiably induce the other to act 
or refrain from acting in a business transaction.”93 
Private actions brought under Rule 10b-5 follow the pattern of common law 
misrepresentation and nondisclosure cases by requiring proof that the defendant 
interfered with a plaintiff’s liberty interests.94  Outside of insider trading, 
plaintiffs bringing a Rule 10b-5 claim most either prove reliance or a breach of 
a duty to disclose in order to establish “the necessary nexus between the 
plaintiffs’ injury and the defendant’s wrongful conduct.”95 
Property only comes into play under the damages96 element of common law 
fraudulent misrepresentation, and the role is limited compared to the anti-fraud 
provisions of federal securities law.  The Restatement describes damages as 
generally measured based on (a) the difference in market value of (1) the object 
received from the tortfeasor and (2) the consideration paid for the object, plus 
(b) any other financial loss suffered because of relying on the 
misrepresentation.97  We can assume that plaintiffs in these cases had property 
rights in the consideration that they used in the transaction and some expectation 
of the usefulness of the objects that they acquired in exchange for their 
consideration.  We can also think of the liberty interests identified in these 
doctrines as liberty related to controlling the use and disposal of one’s property. 
In addition to relying on a violation of a defrauded party’s property rights in 
the transaction consideration, nondisclosure cases sometimes impose liability 
based on a violation of the defrauded person’s equitable ownership rights in 
property to which the defendant held legal title before the transaction.98  Under 
common law, nondisclosure is viewed as analogous to an affirmative 
misrepresentation only in exceptional cases, including when the nondisclosing 
party has information that “the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary 
or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.”99  An example 
of such a case is the failure of a trustee to disclose all material information before 
transacting with a trust beneficiary in trust assets.  Many cite the trust 
beneficiary’s equitable title to trust assets as a justification for the fiduciary’s 
                                                 
 93. Id. § 551 (emphasis added). 
 94. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). 
 95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551. 
 96. Id. § 549 cmt. 1. 
 97. Id. § 549. 
 98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §170 (AM. LAW. INST. 1959) (“The trustee in 
dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee’s own account is under a duty to the beneficiary to deal 
fairly with him and to communicate to him all material facts in connection with the transaction 
which the trustee knows or should know.”); see also id. § 2 (“A trust, as the term is used in [this] 
Restatement…is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom 
the title to the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another 
person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it.”). 
 99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). 
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duty to disclose all material information related to a conflicted transaction.100  
Because some treatises describe these disclosure obligations as required to 
ensure a “fair” transaction, it suggests that some legal doctrines rely on property 
or consent-based notions of fairness.101 
It is worth noting that the damages element in common law fraudulent 
misrepresentation and fraudulent nondisclosure doctrines does not exclusively 
rely on the violation of property rights.  In addition, losses related to rights 
arising out of contractual agreements are also recoverable under these doctrines.  
Plaintiffs defrauded in a business transaction are “also entitled to recover 
additional damages sufficient to give him the benefit of his contract with the 
maker, if these damages are proved with reasonable certainty.”102  Separately, in 
addition to liability resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty, one can face 
liability for nondisclosure under common law in exceptional cases that involve 
no violation of equitable ownership rights.  For example, one can face liability 
for nondisclosure if there are “matters known to him that he knows to be 
necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being 
misleading,” or he “subsequently [acquires] information that he knows will 
make untrue or misleading a previous representation that when made was true 
or believed to be [true].”103 
Therefore, few elements under common law fraudulent misrepresentation or 
fraudulent nondisclosure rely on the violation of some party’s property rights to 
justify imposing liability, and these elements do not rely exclusively on the 
violation of property rights. 
By comparison, because Section 20A of the Exchange Act effectively 
eliminates the need to prove an interference with a party’s liberty interests, 
insider trading cases brought by civilians implicitly place a greater emphasis on 
the violation of some party’s property rights to justify imposing liability.  Most 
agree that liability under the misappropriation theory is premised on the 
defendant violating the property rights of the source of the information.104  In 
addition, the statement of what justifies imposing legal liability under the 
classical theory of insider trading describes liability as premised on the violation 
of the issuer’s property rights in information.105  The element of the test for 
                                                 
 100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (AM. LAW. INST. 1959); see also MERRILL & 
SMITH, supra note 76, at 153–157.  
 101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (AM. LAW. INST. 1959) (“The trustee in 
dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee’s own account is under a duty to the beneficiary to deal 
fairly with him and to communicate to him all material facts in connection with the transaction 
which the trustee knows or should know.”); see also id. § 216 (“The consent of the beneficiary does 
not preclude him from holding the trustee liable for a breach of trust, if…the beneficiary, when he 
gave his consent, did not know of his rights and of the material facts which the trustee knew or 
should have known and which the trustee did not reasonably believe that the beneficiary knew.”). 
 102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). 
 103. Id. § 551. 
 104. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1606. 
 105. See supra Section II.C. 
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insider trading liability that is based on a violation of the issuer’s property rights 
in information is in addition to and separate from any property interests that 
parties trading without inside information have in their transaction 
consideration.  This aspect of the prohibition is analogous to common law trust 
cases in which defendants face liability for a breach of a fiduciary duty to 
disclose.106  But the analogy ends there in insider trading cases. 
Cases brought under the classical and misappropriation theories of insider 
trading seem to disregard the information owner’s liberty interests.  Because it 
is not the source of the information who trades with the defendant in a 
misappropriation case, the deception in question does not induce any action or 
inaction on the part of the legal and equitable owner of the information.  
Moreover, defendants in misappropriation theory cases can avoid insider trading 
liability for using the source’s information without consent.  In explaining that 
deception is an essential element of the misappropriation theory, the Court in 
O’Hagan reiterated that “[t]o satisfy the common law rule that a trustee may not 
use the property that [has] been entrusted [to] him, there would have to be 
consent. To satisfy the requirement of the Securities Act that there be no 
deception, there would only have to be disclosure.”107  In addition, consider that 
issuers in classical theory cases are subject to the same obligation to disclose 
material nonpublic information or abstain from trading under Rule 10b-5.108  If 
issuers are not permitted to trade on the information themselves, we cannot 
expect them to be able to lawfully consent to their employees or other agents 
trading on the information.  Both classical and misappropriation theory cases 
minimize the role of consent. Therefore, both theories places less reliance on the 
interference with a liberty interest than common law fraud or other Rule 10b-5 
cases. 
The elimination of the need to prove a violation of some party’s liberty 
interests to impose liability for insider trading suggests an increased reliance on 
the violation of property rights to justify these doctrines.109 
D.  Summary 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that misappropriation theory cases are 
not the only cases in which liability for insider trading is premised on the 
violation of some party’s property rights.  The duty to disclose or abstain from 
                                                 
 106. It is unclear whether enforcement officials or federal courts are relying on a violation of 
the issuer’s legal title or a transacting shareholder’s equitable title to the information in order to 
impose liability. 
 107. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997) (internal citations omitted). 
 108. See McCormick v. Fund Am. Companies, Inc., 26 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal 
citations omitted) (“Numerous authorities have held or otherwise stated that the corporate issuer in 
possession of material nonpublic information, must, like other insiders in the same situation, 
disclose that information to its shareholders or refrain from trading with them.”). 
 109. Alternatively, the reduced reliance on the violation of liberty interests may be the result 
of an increased reliance on some new animating principle in the doctrine. 
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trading in classical theory cases is derivative of the legal or equitable ownership 
rights that stock issuers and their shareholders have in confidential business 
information.  Beginning with the SEC in Cady, Roberts and continuing with the 
Supreme Court in Chiarella (and beyond), an insider making personal use of 
information intended for the sole benefit of the company is the breach of 
fiduciary duty that justifies liability in classical theory cases.  The connection 
between the fiduciary duties in classical theory cases and property rights 
becomes more obvious when we recognize that the violation of property rights 
in misappropriation theory cases is always tied to breaches of duty arising out of 
fiduciary or similar relationships of trust and confidence. 
In addition, the SEC and federal courts rely on Section 17(a) of the Securities 
Act and Rule 10b-5, which aim to protect investors’ property rights in their 
securities, money, and other transaction consideration.  Finally, unlike other 
fraudulent deception cases, insider trading doctrine almost eliminates the need 
to prove an interference with the plaintiff’s liberty interests.  As a result, the 
prohibition may place a greater reliance on the violation of some party’s property 
rights to justify imposing liability. 
Of course, the preceding analysis does not support the conclusion that U.S. 
insider trading doctrine can be fully explained by a property rationale.  However, 
the evidence does support accepting the conclusion that property principles 
always play a role in the regulation of insider trading.  With the continuous and 
undeniable reliance on property principles to justify liability under both the 
classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading, one should ask why 
so many scholars have missed the fact that the SEC and courts rely on property, 
in part, to justify the prohibition under the classical theory.  The next Section 
explores one explanation: many scholars treat property principles as either 
unimportant or nonexistent in an area of law that clearly embodies some other 
doctrine. 
III.  MISSING THE ROLE OF PROPERTY IN THE REGULATION 
Many legal scholars view insider trading law as either devoid of or only 
occasionally motivated by property principles.110  Some have described this area 
of law as a form of federal securities fraud doctrine, or common law fraud and 
fiduciary duties doctrine—not property doctrine.111  For these scholars, the 
                                                 
 110. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1591; Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 314; Karmel, 
supra note 6, at 168. 
 111. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1591 (“The insider trading prohibition ought to be viewed 
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securities fraud….Unfortunately, the SEC’s regulatory jurisdiction over insider trading meant that 
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creation of new information and those that allow the existing stock of information to be well used.  
If the Court puts information cases in securities law or evidence law pigeonholes, it may overlook 
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driving force behind federal securities regulation is the mandatory disclosure 
requirements aimed at investor protection, which they describe as being at odds 
with protecting property rights in information.112  Many only view the 
misappropriation theory of liability as justified by the goal of protecting property 
rights and treat the classical theory of liability as devoid of property 
justifications.113 
The debate among securities regulation scholars over whether property 
principles best explain the current insider trading regime is analogous to a debate 
that intellectual property scholars are having about trade secret law.114 Many of 
these scholars seem to take an underinclusive approach to identifying distinct 
doctrinal principles in one area of law.  Its seems as if many securities regulation 
scholars are looking for the one legal doctrine that explains all insider trading 
cases.115  Yet there are bodies of law containing property principles while 
simultaneously containing tort116 or contract117 principles.  It is therefore 
possible for federal securities regulations to simultaneously contain multiple 
doctrines.  This Section highlights a few examples of the underinclusive 
approach to identifying property principles in insider trading scholarship.  It then 
identifies examples of property doctrine operating concurrently with other legal 
doctrines. 
                                                 
the need to consider the way in which the incentive to produce information and the demands of 
current use conflict.”); see also Karmel, supra note 6, at 168 (Karmel, a former Securities and 
Exchange Commissioner, described the “view that inside information is a property right that 
insiders should be permitted to exploit [as] morally obnoxious and legally unsound.”). 
 112. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1608 (“The basic function of a securities fraud regime is to 
ensure timely disclosure of accurate information to investors.”); see also id. at 1649 (“If we want 
to protect investors from informational disadvantages that cannot be overcome by research or 
skill…[then] the equal access test is far better suited to doing so than the Chiarella/Dirks [property 
rights] framework.”); see Karmel, supra note 6, at 168–173 (Karmel concluded that the property 
and other private law rationales for the insider trading prohibition were “simply inadequate to cover 
the fact patterns of cases in which some have been enjoined by the SEC or have even gone to 
prison.”  She argued that a better doctrinal fit would come from an increased understanding of the 
prohibition as protecting investors by supplementing the “mandatory continuous disclosure 
system” in U.S. securities law). 
 113. See Kim, supra note 1, at 947, 974–986. 
 114. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 
86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 244 (1998). (“The relational focus of trade secret’s liability rules aligns 
trade secret law more closely with the law of contract than with the law of property.”); Mark A. 
Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313 
(2008) (Arguing “that trade secrets can be justified as a form, not of traditional property, but of 
intellectual property (IP).”); Eric R. Claeys, Private Law Theory and Corrective Justice in Trade 
Secrecy, 4 J. TORT L. [ii], 63 (2011) (Arguing “that the proprietary account of trade secrecy explains 
the most features of trade secrecy.”). 
 115. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 116. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 22.  Consider that trespass and conversion are viewed as 
both tort and property doctrine. 
 117. Id. at 36.  Consider that lease and license frameworks are viewed as embodying both 
property and contract principles. 
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A.  Property Or . . . 
One of the first articles to address the property implications of the prohibition 
on insider trading was a response to Henry Manne’s seminal Insider Trading 
and the Stock Market.118  Manne opposed the prohibition on insider trading on 
economic grounds.  In a review of Manne’s book, Richard W. Jennings argued 
that the prohibition was justified as a means of protecting the property rights of 
shareholders, who he described as the ultimate owners of the information.119  
Manne countered that Jennings’ argument was a red herring and rejected the 
concept of “property” as useful for resolving any policy dispute.120  Manne 
declared that “the concept of property is no more nor less than the rights and 
obligations recognized by law,” and that the real issue is determining how the 
law should develop based on objective methods of analysis.121 
Scholars using economic analysis eventually combined Manne’s call for 
objective analysis with a focus on property doctrine.  In the early 1980s, scholars 
such as Frank Easterbrook and Jonathan Macey began to explore whether a 
property-based approach to the regulation of insider trading (as opposed to, 
respectively, securities fraud and fairness approaches) would increase or 
decrease efficiency in securities markets.122  In 1981, Easterbrook claimed that 
the Supreme Court was treating insider trading cases as securities cases, thereby 
putting “them in pigeonholes having little to do with information.”123  By 
contrast, Easterbrook assumed that in information cases “the central question 
was whether the principal had a property interest sufficient to require the agent 
neither to use nor to disclose without the principal’s consent.”124  In 1984, Macey 
attempted to encourage what he described as the U.S. Supreme Court’s “new 
understanding of the fact that privileged corporate information is a valuable asset 
in the nature of a property interest.”125  Macey described this as a new 
understanding because he considered the pre-Chiarella interpretation of Rule 
10b-5 as intended to maximize fairness among trading parties and as (at best) 
indifferent to the protection of property or contract rights.126 
Many of the scholars who followed Macey and Easterbrook continued to draw 
sharp distinctions viewing insider trading as a form of property doctrine and 
some other doctrine.  For example, in 1987 Richard J. Morgan offered what he 
described as “a proposed property rights approach to the analysis of insider 
trading restrictions,” which he argued would resolve many of the analytical 
                                                 
 118. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). 
 119. See Jennings, supra note 1, at 1234. 
 120. Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 550 
(1970). 
 121. Id. at 550. 
 122. See Easterbrook, supra note 1; Macey, supra note 1. 
 123. See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 312. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See Macey, supra note 1, at 11. 
 126. MACEY, supra note 8, at 50–58; see also Macey, supra note 1, at 10–11. 
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problems inherent in the doctrine at that time.127  Morgan concluded that the 
Supreme Court’s focus on “common law fraud [and] fiduciary 
duties…contributed to the continuing uncertainty concerning the justification 
and the application of the insider trading rules.”128  Later, Roberta S. Karmel, a 
former commissioner of the SEC, described the “view that inside information is 
a property right that insiders should be permitted to exploit [as] morally 
obnoxious and legally unsound.”129  Karmel concluded that, as a doctrinal 
matter, property and other private law limitations on the prohibition articulated 
by the Supreme Court were “simply inadequate to cover the fact patterns of cases 
in which some have been enjoined by the SEC or have even gone to prison.”130  
She argued that a better doctrinal fit would come from an increased 
understanding of the prohibition as protecting investors by supplementing the 
“mandatory continuous disclosure system” in U.S. securities law.131 
Karmel’s conclusion that a property rationale does a poor job of explaining 
past decisions has been echoed in recent scholarship.  In Insider Trading as 
Private Corruption, Sung Hui Kim concludes that although a property rationale 
may offer a “compelling normative approach to insider trading, [the rationale] 
lacks sufficient descriptive power.”132  She argues that current insider trading 
doctrine is missing two central features of American property doctrine—
exclusion and alienability.  As a result, she concludes that a property rationale 
not only does a poor job of describing past cases, but also has almost no “chance 
at real-world relevance for judges and regulators grappling with hard cases.”133 
The prior scholarship grappling with the role of property in insider trading 
cases seems to take for granted that the current law is devoid of property 
principles in some important way.  It then proceeds to argue about how or why 
lawmakers, regulators, and courts should or should not regulate insider trading 
using property principles in the future.  An example of this implicit assumption 
is Stephen M. Bainbridge’s article Insider Trader Regulation: The Path 
Dependent Choice between Property Rights and Securities Fraud.134  In that 
article, Bainbridge states that: 
The insider trading prohibition ought to be viewed as a means of 
protecting property rights in information, rather than as a means of 
preventing securities fraud.  Viewed from that perspective, the pre-
O’Hagan misappropriation theory correctly imposed liability on those 
who converted information that belonged to another for their own 
personal profit.  Unfortunately, the SEC’s regulatory jurisdiction over 
                                                 
 127. Morgan, supra note 14, at 81. 
 128. Id. at 90. 
 129. See Karmel, supra note 6, at 168. 
 130. Id. at 173. 
 131. Id. at 169. 
 132. See Kim, supra note 1, at 977. 
 133. Id. at 986. 
 134. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1589. 
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insider trading meant that the problem was treated as a species of 
securities fraud rather than one of property rights.  [A] property rights-
based understanding of the prohibition…would premise liability on 
theft, not deception.  Because the text of Section 10(b), or Rule 10b-
5, clearly addresses deceit, not conversion of intellectual property, the 
strict textualist approach to statutory interpretation mandated by 
Central Bank proscribes such an understanding.135 
According to Bainbridge, treating insider trading as a species of securities 
fraud means that disclosure is the primary tool used to protect investors—not the 
recognition and protection of property rights.136  He goes so far as to describe 
the protection of investors as being at odds with the protection of property 
rights.137  His view of a necessary split between securities fraud and property 
protection is similar to the separation perceived by Morgan, Karmel, 
Easterbrook and Macey.  Morgan offered his property proposal as a cure to a 
perceived overreliance on common law fraud and fiduciary duty concepts.  
Karmel treats a property approach as necessarily in conflict with a regime 
committed to using disclosure requirements in order to protect investors.  
Easterbrook wanted to use a property rationale as an alternative to a securities 
fraud rationale and, like Macey, argued that the “fairness arguments get us 
nowhere.”138 
What makes these perceived dichotomies strange is that securities fraud 
doctrines are always property doctrines.  As explained in Part II.C. above, 
fiduciary duties of disclosure are generally aimed at the protection of a 
beneficiary’s property interests. This fact makes sense considering that many 
fiduciary relationships cannot be created without the existence of property being 
held in trust.139  In addition, there are many areas in American law in which 
fairness is defined as the protection of property or other private rights.  
Moreover, many tort and criminal doctrines, such as trespass and conversion, 
are specifically property tort and property crime doctrines.  These property-and 
doctrines can be understood in contrast to doctrines based exclusively on liberty 
interests, such as battery or false imprisonment.  Property-and doctrines can also 
be understood by differentiating them from exclusively public law doctrines, 
such as those prohibiting the capture of endangered species. 
                                                 
 135. Id. at 1591, 1618. 
 136. Id. at 1608 (“The basic function of a securities fraud regime is to ensure timely disclosure 
of accurate information to investors.”). 
 137. See id. at 1606 (“There is a growing consensus that the federal insider trading prohibition 
is more easily justified as a means of protecting property rights in information than as a way of 
protecting investors.”); see also id. at 1649 (“If we want to protect investors from informational 
disadvantages that cannot be overcome by research or skill…[then] the equal access test is far better 
suited to doing so than the Chiarella/Dirks [property rights] framework.”). 
 138. See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 330; see also Macey, supra note 1, at 10 (Concluding 
that the fairness “justifications were vague and ill formed and did not provide a coherent basis for 
imposing legal sanctions.”). 
 139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 66 (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
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B.  Property And . . . 
As explained in Part II.D, liability for common law fraudulent 
misrepresentation or fraudulent nondisclosure almost always requires the 
interference with both a plaintiff’s liberty and property interests for liability to 
be imposed.140  The duty to disclose or abstain from trading in insider trading 
cases is analogous to the fiduciary duty of a trustee to disclose all material 
information to a trust beneficiary before transacting in trust assets for the benefit 
of the trustee.141  The law recognizes this duty as arising from the trust 
beneficiary’s equitable title to trust assets being superior to the trustee’s legal 
title to trust assets.142 
In the context of publicly traded companies, it is not unreasonable to view the 
issuer as analogous to a trustee, the shareholder as analogous to a trust 
beneficiary, and insiders as analogous to agents of the trustee.  Under this 
framework, insiders might acquire the issuer’s duty of disclosure to shareholders 
because they have agreed to manage corporate assets for the benefit of the 
corporation, and the corporation has a duty to generate profits for the sole benefit 
of shareholders as a whole.  Therefore, the disclose or abstain rule has the 
potential to operate as a form of protection of each shareholder’s equitable title 
in the value of inside information, which would eliminate any conflict between 
disclosure rules and rules that protect property rights in information. 
Finally, defining fairness as the protection of some party’s property rights is 
a common aspect of American law, especially in the area of trade secrets.143  As 
a form of unfair competition, the Restatements identify the “appropriation of 
intangible trade values including trade secrets.”144  In applying Texas’ trade 
secret law, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals described the principle in the 
following manner: 
That the cost of devising the secret and the value the secret provides 
are criteria in the legal formulation of a trade secret shows the 
equitable underpinnings of this area of the law.  It seems only fair that 
one should be able to keep and enjoy the fruits of his labor.  If a 
businessman has worked hard, has used his imagination, and has taken 
bold steps to gain an advantage over his competitors, he should be able 
to profit from his efforts.  Because a commercial advantage can vanish 
once the competition learns of it, the law should protect the 
businessman’s efforts to keep his achievements secret.  As is discussed 
                                                 
 140. See infra Section II.D. 
 141. See Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 233–34 (Ga. 1903) (describing a director as “a quasi 
trustee as to the shareholder’s interest in the shares”). 
 142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 2, 74, and 170 (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
 143. While some scholars dispute whether the area of trade secrets is properly conceived of as 
property, tort, or some other doctrine, other scholars view this distinction as false.  Further, as 
discussed, infra in Section II.B., the U.S. Supreme Court emphatically endorsed the recognition of 
confidential business information as a form of property in Carpenter v. United States. 
 144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
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below, this is an area of law in which simple fairness still plays a large 
role.145 
Despite the fact that liability for insider trading is premised on the misuse of 
confidential business information, it has gone almost unacknowledged that the 
conception of fairness used to impose liability in insider trading cases is almost 
completely at odds with the conception of fairness used in trade secret cases.146  
The version of fairness embodied in trade secret and other unfair competition 
doctrines can be thought of as the “sweat equity” or the “property-based” 
conception of fairness (property-based fairness).147 
The foregoing analysis does not support the claim that U.S. insider trading 
doctrine is a property doctrine, or that a property rationale is sufficient for 
explaining past cases or deciding future cases.  However, the analysis does 
support the conclusion that it would be a mistake to treat certain non-property 
doctrines as completely unrelated to property doctrine.  Although the U.S. 
insider trading regime does not strictly or consistently rely on common law 
fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent nondisclosure, or trust principles when 
imposing liability, the fact that these doctrines can and often do rely on property 
principles demonstrates that treating fraud, fiduciary duty, fairness, or disclosure 
doctrines as mutually exclusive from property doctrine is a mistake. 
Of course, simply knowing that property principles have consistently 
animated insider trading law is not that useful.  Therefore, the next Section 
explores a few of the implications of this fact. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATION 
Using the defendant’s violation of some party’s property rights in information 
as a justification to impose legal liability has implications for the appropriate 
scope and limits of insider trading doctrine.  To the extent that the protection of 
property rights cannot explain the scope of the law, then either something has 
gone wrong or there are other valid principles animating this area of law.  If 
something has gone wrong, then some or all of the current insider trading regime 
may be illegitimate.  If other valid principles are animating this area of law, then 
what are they? Both alternatives have implications for insider trading reform. 
This Section explores these issues. 
                                                 
 145. Metallurgical Indus. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1201 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 146. See Albert D. Spalding, Insider Tradings: Is there a Better Way? A proposed “Trade 
Secrets” Approach, 11 MIDWEST L. REV. 140 (1993). 
 147. See Sweat Equity, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS (BARRON’S 
BUSINESS GUIDES) (9th ed. 2014) (Equity created in a property by the hard work of the owner. For 
example, a small business may be built up more on the efforts of its founders than on the capital 
raised to finance it).   
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A.  Illegitimacy and Insider Trading 
If there are no other principles animating this area of law, then the failure of 
the current insider trading regime to adhere to property principles should raise 
concerns about legality.  One question is whether the current regime meets the 
standards of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  The APA requires courts 
to hold an agency action unlawful if it is found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”148  Further, 
although economic regulations generally receive deference when constitutional 
challenges are brought, that deference might be undermined if the justifications 
presented by enforcement officials appear to be pretextual.149  The Supreme 
Court will not always revisit the reasonableness of enforcement actions and 
statutory interpretations once approved.150  However, an exception may be 
warranted by the anomalous character of a regime that is justified by reference 
to statutes and rules aimed at the protection of property rights and that premises 
liability on the violation of property rights, while simultaneously restricting the 
exercise of those rights.  Unless the APA creates a statute of limitations on 
reviewing agency actions, the disconnect between the current insider trading 
regime and property principles may warrant determining whether imposing 
liability for the practice fails to accord with the law. 
If the ban on insider trading is motivated by a government policy objective 
that conflicts with the protection of property rights, then justifying liability based 
on the goal of protecting property rights becomes problematic.  Recall that there 
are myriad ways in which the current enforcement of the law and related statutes 
undermine the protection of property and other private rights.  Scholars like 
Nagy,151 Karmel,152 and Kim153 have highlighted several departures from the 
expected elements of a property regime.  These departures from the expected 
elements of a property regime may be the result of valid complementary 
principles animating the law.154  However, they may also be the result of agency 
reasoning that was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.  The 
disconnect is substantial enough to warrant an investigation. 
                                                 
 148. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 149. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2573–74 (2019) (The Supreme Court 
upheld the inclusion of a citizenship question in the 2020 census because the plaintiffs were able 
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 151. Nagy, supra note 43, at 1336–64 (discussing how federal courts and enforcement officials 
have cast aside fiduciary principles, implying casting aside related property principles). 
 152. See Karmel, supra note 6, at 152. 
 153. See Kim, supra note 1, at 979–86 (highlighting the absences of alienability in insider 
trading doctrine). 
 154. See supra Section III.B. 
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An alternative concern is that lawmakers and courts have unintentionally 
constructed a convoluted and unworkable regime in the area of insider trading.  
John P. Anderson has argued that the current doctrine is vague, irrational, and 
incoherent to the point of being unjust.155  If he is correct, then the current regime 
might fail the constitutional test by lacking a rational basis or for being too 
vague.  These concerns may seem irrelevant since laws that restrict property 
rights (e.g., zoning laws) have been accepted by courts as plausibly aimed at 
serving some property protecting functions.156  Further, laws are only 
infrequently deemed void for vagueness and that doctrine is generally only 
applied to statues, not judge-made law.157  However, because the Supreme Court 
has shown decreasing levels of deference to flexible interpretations of the law 
over the last several decades, there may be enough of a shift in approach in the 
near future to undercut the continued viability of the  insider trading regime. 
The first constitutional concern is related to two statutory changes that 
Congress made in the 1980s.  With Section 20A of the Exchange Act, Congress 
authorized standing to bring private suits for those who trade contemporaneously 
and in the opposite direction of defendants in insider trading cases.158  Congress 
also amended Section 20A of the Exchange Act to increase the controlling 
person liability faced by the employers of defendants in insider trading cases.159  
Because of the amendments to Section 20(a), issuers in classical theory cases 
and sources of information in misappropriation cases face liability for three 
times the profits generated or losses avoided by the defendants in these cases.160  
If a constitutional challenge is brought, courts may conclude that both provisions 
fail to meet the flexible limits of the rational basis test. 
Section 20A of the Exchange Act is constitutionally suspect because it gives 
standing to someone other than the information owner to bring a private suit for 
violating a prohibition that is premised on the violation of the owner’s property 
rights in information.  If there are no other principles animating this area of law, 
then allowing those who trade contemporaneously to have standing to sue is 
bizarre. In misappropriation theory cases the source of the information is both 
the legal and equitable owner of the information.  Therefore, it makes no sense 
for a violation of the source’s property rights in information to authorize an 
unrelated third party to sue the defendants in these cases.  In classical theory 
                                                 
 155. ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 5. 
 156. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (“There is no serious 
difference of opinion in respect of the validity of laws and regulations fixing the height of buildings 
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 157. See Ryan McCarl, Incoherent and Indefensible: An Interdisciplinary Critque of the 
Supreme Court’s “Void -For-Vagueness” Doctrine, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 73, 91 (2014). 
 158. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a) (2012). 
 159. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(3) (2012). 
 160. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2) (2012). 
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cases, parties with and without any ownership interest in the information have 
standing to sue.  Section 20A of the Exchange Act gives standing to 
counterparties who were shareholders before the prohibited trades, which 
implies that standing is justified by the shareholders’ equitable title to inside 
information.  However, Section 20A also gives standing to counterparties who 
were not shareholders before the transaction.  This standing framework is a 
continuation of SEC and court decisions that recognized non-shareholders as 
being injured by insiders who sell their shares without first disclosing material 
nonpublic information.161  This framework, however, conflicts with a regime 
premised on the violation of some party’s property rights in information. 
Scholars such as Macey and Anderson have argued that using Section 20(a) 
to impose controlling person liability on the information owners in insider 
trading cases is irrational.162  The case law is replete with references to 
information in classical theory cases being “available only for a corporate 
purpose.”163  In addition, recall that the Court in O’Hagan argued that insider 
trading in misappropriation theory cases is akin to the defendant embezzling the 
property of the source of the information.164  Yet Congress has authorized the 
corporate issuer in classical theory cases and the source of the information in 
misappropriation theory cases to face legal penalties if it can be shown that they 
did not take sufficient steps to prevent the violation of their property rights.  The 
same violation of property rights cited to justify imposing liability for insider 
trading on the agents of the information owners.  If insider trading is analogous 
to embezzlement, then the use of Section 20(a) in these cases is analogous to 
punishing the victims of embezzlement for being robbed by their agents. 
It is difficult to imagine a rational basis for punishing the victims in cases of 
theft or fraud. It may be tempting to explain this approach by claiming that by 
failing to prevent insider trading, the owners of the information are vicariously 
liable for the third-party harm caused by their agents’ illegal trading. However, 
recall the problems with Section 20A of the Exchange Act noted in this Section 
and the issues raised in the circuit split that inspired Section 20A of the Exchange 
Act.165  If insiders are unable to influence the counter parties to their transactions 
to participate, then insider trading does not embodying the reliance and causation 
elements required to prove fraudulent nondisclosure in other cases.166 Therefore, 
it seems mistaken to view insider trading resulting in the infringement of the 
property or liberty interests of any market participant other than the information 
owners—who now face legal penalties under Section 20A of the Exchange Act 
if they do not do enough to prevent their agents from stealing their information. 
                                                 
 161. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911–13 (Nov. 8, 1961). 
 162. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra Section II.B. 
 164. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997). 
 165. See supra Section I.D. 
 166. See supra Section II.C. 
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A second question is whether the interpretations of the anti-fraud statues and 
rules used to prohibit insider trading can continue to be described as reasonable.  
This concern is related to the question of constitutionality but is more precisely 
a matter of statutory interpretation.  In Chiarella, the Supreme Court argues that 
it is “not a novel twist of the law” that insiders in possession of material 
nonpublic information are required to disclose that information or abstain from 
trading.167  In O’Hagan, the Court described the misappropriation theory of 
liability as punishing behavior that constitutes common law fraudulent deception 
“akin to embezzlement.”168  These determinations were made with Section 17(a) 
of the Securities Act and Rule 10b-5 in mind.  Recall that Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 are explicitly aimed at protecting 
the property and liberty interests of market participants.  Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act specifically outlaws the use of misrepresentations “to obtain 
money or property” of investors through “the offer or sale of any securities.”169  
The question remains: how can courts continue to describe a regime that restricts 
so many incidents of ownership as plausibly aimed at preventing or remedying 
fraudulent deception or nondisclosure? 
Holding property owners liable for using their own property or for allowing 
third parties to use their property is more analogous to an inalienability rule or a 
vice law than a property rule.170  Insider trading doctrine both prohibits certain 
information owners from using their information for securities trading and bars 
these owners from licensing third parties to do the same. These restrictions 
contradict the common and long-standing expectation that property owners have 
a right to partially alienate their property for consideration.171  Consider that the 
restrictions on the owners’ use of their own inside information found in Rule 
14e-3 was deemed acceptable by the Court in part because Congress authorized 
the SEC to define new behaviors as fraudulent in the context of regulating tender 
offers.172  Rule 10b-5 and Section 17(a) do not make similar delegations of 
lawmaking authority, so it is problematic that a doctrine based on statutes aimed 
                                                 
 167. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). 
 168. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654. 
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at protecting property and other private rights would break from the common 
elements of property regimes in so many ways.173 
However problematic the Courts interpretive decisions in Chiarella and 
O’Hagan may seem in hindsight, there are canons of statutory interpretation that 
would support maintaining the status quo.  Many would argue that stare decisis 
warrants accepting these prior interpretations and deferring to Congress to make 
any changes that would contradict the expectations that have developed around 
these decisions.  Consider, for example, the passage of the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA).  Some argue that the reenactment doctrine 
requires treating the passage of ITSA and ITSFEA as congressional 
authorization of the insider trading doctrine previously developed in the 
courts.174 
There is good reason, however, to doubt that adhering to either stare decisis 
or the reenactment doctrine would weigh in favor of deference in the context of 
insider trading law.  To the extent that both canons are aimed at fostering rule of 
law principles such as stability and notice, the popular view that insider trading 
doctrine is incoherent and confusing may make both canons of interpretation 
inapplicable to this area of law.  For decades, scholars have lamented the 
incoherence of insider trading law.175  Recall that Anderson has recently 
described the doctrine as vague and incoherent to the point of being unjust.176  
Even some prominent enforcement officials have recently described the law as 
so confusing that it leaves investors uncertain “about what sorts of information-
sharing or other activities by investors would be considered insider trading.”177 
The popularity of describing insider trading law as unclear is surprising 
considering that the complaints come from scholars who disagree about whether 
insider trading should be prohibited178 and from enforcement officials who are 
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known for penalizing dozens of individuals and organizations under the current 
doctrine.179  The consensus that the doctrine is incoherent undermines the 
conclusion that the law is stable enough for market participants to rely on past 
decisions to have notice of the law.  It also warrants viewing Congress’ decision 
not to define insider trading in either 1980s statute as more akin to a student 
turning in an incomplete assignment, than as an implied endorsement of the 
ambiguous status quo. 
Whether the Supreme Court will decide to abandon the current interpretations 
of Rule 10b-5 or Section 17(a) of the Securities Act in the context of insider 
trading is impossible to tell.  If the analysis in this Article is correct, however, 
and many have missed the property principles animating the doctrine, then the 
Court has at least one reason to reconsider its prior decisions. 
B.  Property And . . . Other Valid Principles 
The alternative explanation for the failure of the current insider trading regime 
to adhere to property principles is that valid competing principles are also 
motivating the doctrine. Most legal regimes contain general rules and exceptions 
to those rules.  Some exceptions are authorized by an overarching policy 
objective that also justifies the general rule.  Consider the statute of frauds, which 
limits the availability of injunctive relief to those real property transactions that 
are reduced to writing.180  The goal of reducing the incidents of fraudulent 
transfers by increasing the demands for a certain quality of evidence is clearly 
in harmony with the goal of protecting an owner’s rights of exclusive use and 
disposal in a parcel of land.  Other exceptions to general rules are authorized by 
a competing government interest that is given explicit priority in a specific 
context.  For example, consider conservation laws that prohibit capturing or 
selling wild animals that are listed under the Endangered Species Act.181  The 
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Act unambiguously prioritizes the conservation of specific species over the 
property principles of acquisition182 and alienation.183 
Insider trading doctrine may be best understood as prioritizing a competing 
government interest over a general rule aimed at protecting the property rights 
of information owners. The starting assumption in insider trading classical 
theory cases is that inside information is intended for the exclusive use and 
benefit of the issuer and its shareholders.  Issuing companies are free to use their 
inside information to run their organizations.184  For example, they can use the 
information about a planned decrease in their quarterly dividends to execute the 
dividend and put cash into the hands of their shareholders.  They may also use 
the information related to undisclosed merger negotiations to conduct the 
diligence and planning necessary to complete the merger.  Similarly, the tender 
offerors in misappropriation theory cases may use material nonpublic 
information about their planned acquisition to successfully take control of a 
target company. 
Based on this starting assumption, some scholars have argued that the 
prohibition on insider trading can be thought of as a means of achieving the 
overarching objective of protecting the property rights of issuers and other 
sources of information.185  Yet information owners in both classical and 
misappropriation theory cases face controlling person liability and treble 
damages under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act if their agents engage in 
illegal trading—with or without the owner’s consent.186  Because controlling 
person liability under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act increases the harm to 
the information owner’s property interest, it would not be reasonable to view the 
prohibition as an exception aimed at fostering an underlying objective of the 
general rule.  Moreover, viewing the prohibition as aimed at protecting the 
property interests of information owners seems absurd because information 
owners are barred by other rules from consenting to the use of the information 
in securities trading. 
So what competing government interest(s) explains the departures from the 
common characteristics of a property regime found in insider trading doctrine? 
Fairness and investor confidence are two obvious candidates for the additional 
principles in insider trading law that compete with property doctrine.  The first 
is not simply fairness, but specifically an equal-information conception of 
fairness (equal-information fairness).  The two-pronged test explaining liability 
for insider trading found in Cady, Roberts and Chiarella contains a second 
justification for imposing liability, which may have been reaffirmed by the 
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Supreme Court in O’Hagan.187  In Chiarella, the Court explained that the duty 
to disclose or abstain from trading on inside information arose from “(i) the 
existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a 
corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without 
disclosure.”188 
Recall that both common law fraudulent nondisclosure doctrine and trade 
secret doctrine seem to be animated by property-based fairness principles.189  
Property-based fairness generally requires the consent of the information owner 
for a conflicted transaction to be lawful.  As a consequences, the disclosure 
requirements in fraudulent nondisclosure cases outside of insider trading 
facilitate achieving the kind of consent required to ensure that conflicted 
transactions do not result in a breach a fiduciary or similar duty of loyalty.190 
By contrast, the classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading 
abandon consent and make simple disclosure a defense against liability.  
Viewing disclosure as sufficient for avoiding liability for insider trading, and not 
as a means of obtaining the right kind of consent, suggests that the doctrine is 
animated by something other than the protection of property rights.  And 
focusing on the parties recognized as victims of insider trading may help us to 
identify the government interest that has been prioritized over the protection of 
the property rights of information owners. 
In addition to identifying the information owners as victims, insider trading 
legislation and case law also recognizes the counterparties to the trade as the 
parties who have been injured by the prohibited trading. The view that an 
investor is injured if they trade with counterparties bearing less risk or 
counterparties holding more valuable information suggests that the doctrine is 
animated by an equal-information or economic equality principle. 
The second candidate for an additional principle animating this area of law is 
the investor confidence or market integrity rationale offered by the Court in 
O’Hagan.191  In O’Hagan, the Court states that imposing liability under the 
misappropriation theory is in line with the “animating purpose of the Exchange 
Act: to ensure honest securities markets and thereby promoting investor 
confidence.”192  The Court acknowledges that some information asymmetries 
are inevitable in securities markets.  It then goes on to argue that investors are 
likely to avoid markets where some participants have misappropriation-derived 
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information advantages, because those advantages stem  “from contrivance, not 
luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or skill.”193 
It is unclear how the average investor would determine which kind of 
information advantages (if any) are being used by his counterparties in the 
marketplace.194  This epistemic challenge may explain how the pursuit of some 
version of investor confidence through the prohibition of some information 
asymmetries might cause departures from long-standing property principles.  If 
investors would find it difficult to differentiate between counterparties with 
acceptable and unacceptable information advantages, then it may be equally 
difficult for courts and enforcement officials to do so.  Therefore, to the extent 
that insider trading doctrine departs from the common elements of a property 
regime, the difficulty of precisely differentiating between acceptable and 
unacceptable information advantages may have caused the development of 
conflicts in the doctrine. 
Of course, we do not have to choose only one of these two principles to 
explain the departures from a property regime in insider trading doctrine.  Recall 
that the scholars who rejected the explanatory power of property principles in 
insider trading doctrine may have held unnecessarily narrow expectations by 
assuming that one rationale would explain the entirety of a doctrine without the 
existence of other animating principles.195  If common law nondisclosure and 
trade secret doctrines can contain property principles and fairness principles, it 
may be possible for insider trading doctrine to contain equal-information 
principles and investor confidence principles, while simultaneously being 
motivated by property principles.  The question becomes whether the many 
principles present in the doctrine can operate together harmoniously. 
C.  Opportunities for Legal Reform 
A third implication of property principles animating insider trading doctrine 
is that the call for legal reform might be satisfied by bringing the doctrine into 
greater harmony with the expected features of a property regime.196  
Alternatively, reformers can clearly authorize a departure from the expectations 
of a property regime.  Section IV.C. describes legal regimes in which general 
rules are qualified by either (1) exceptions that are in harmony with some 
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overarching government interest or (2) exceptions that clearly prioritize a 
competing government interest. It is also possible, however, to have a legal 
regime in which the general rule is modified by opaquely prioritizing a 
competing government interest.  This last possibility would likely lead to 
confusion on the part of enforcement officials, courts, and civilians; it may also 
explain the perceived incoherence of the current insider trading regime. 
The equal-information or investor confidence goals discussed above may be 
the competing government interest(s) that are opaquely prioritized over a general 
rule aimed at protecting the property rights of information owners.  A legal 
regime cannot protect property—or exclusive use—rights in information while 
simultaneously fostering equal access to or use of the same information.  The 
tension between these two principles may explain why the current doctrine 
identifies disclosure by the fiduciary—not the consent of the beneficiary—as a 
defense against liability for insider trading.  It may also explain why courts have 
held issuers in classical theory cases to the same duty to disclose material 
information or abstain from trading.  Both departures would make sense in a 
regime animated by equal access principles, even if liability is often limited to 
those defendants who obtained the information through a fiduciary or similar 
relationship of trust and confidence. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s explicit 
rejection of the equal access rationale in Chiarella would force anyone 
committed to information equality to use the opaque prioritization approach.  
The confidence of market participants is often fostered by the protection of 
property rights—including those rights used to facilitate trading based on 
information asymmetries.  Still, the courts have concluded that fostering investor 
confidence requires prohibiting trading with some information asymmetries 
without clarifying the relationship between the kinds of information 
asymmetries prohibited and information owners’ exclusive use rights. 
Clarifying which, if any, government interests will be prioritized over the 
protection of property rights in the regulation of insider trading could solve the 
over-inclusiveness problems lurking in two prominent reform proposals. The 
current proposals for insider trading reform start with the assumption that the 
confusion in the law is rooted in the narrowness of what qualifies as a breach of 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty.  Many have argued that the duty of loyalty concept 
is too narrow, because some defendants were able to avoid liability for trading 
with information obtained by hacking into a company’s computers.197  As a 
corrective, these proposals recommend statutes that premise liability on the 
“wrongful use” of information in securities trading.198  Recognizing the risk of 
over-correction by replacing an under-inclusive concept with an over-inclusive 
concept, both major proposals define what might constitute “wrongful use.” 
Unfortunately, neither proposed clarification will prevent the proposed regimes 
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from being problematically unambiguous without addressing the role of consent 
in the law. 
“Consent” is the key issue if officials want to clarify which kind of informed 
trading will be deemed wrongful.  In addition to the case law presenting 
conflicting justifications for insider trading liability, the statutes and rules 
regulating the practice express conflicting views of the rights and obligations of 
securities market participants.  Insider trading cases are primarily brought under 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5 and Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act.  Outside of insider trading cases, those provisions are applied 
using a framework that resembles the common law principles for fraudulent 
misrepresentation and fraudulent nondisclosure.199  This means that outside of 
insider trading cases, when defendants face liability for fraudulent nondisclosure 
under Rule 10b-5 and 17(a) it is because by failing to make the appropriate 
disclosures they failed to obtain the right kind of consent.200 
At least two Supreme Court decisions tried to revitalize the principle of 
consent in insider trading cases, but without using the word.  In Chiarella, both 
the Court and the SEC acknowledged that a tender offeror could authorize 
friendly investors to purchase stock in a target company ahead of a public 
announcement of the offer without violating Rule 10b-5.201  In Dirks, the 
majority warned against over-inclusive restrictions on trading with information 
advantages, because the approach would prevent issuers from engaging in 
selective disclosure of valuable information when doing so was beneficial to the 
company.202  Nevertheless, the SEC adoption of Regulation FD203 and Rule 14e-
3204 make it unlawful for information owners to consent to the use of their 
information for securities trading.  These rules were described by the SEC as 
being aimed at closing loopholes in the regulation of insider trading. 
Combined with the case law that penalizes issuers in classical theory cases for 
trading on their own information, the rejection of consent in Regulation FD and 
Rule 14e-3 make the current insider trading regime operate more like 
inalienability rules or vice laws, than like property rules. Combined with the case 
law and statutory provisions rooting the authority to impose liability for insider 
trading in the violation of some party’s property rights in information, the 
inalienability features in insider trading doctrine make the regime unnecessarily 
confusing.  Reformers can solve this problem by using consent to define the 
outer limits of their proposed wrongful use principle. If insider trading 
defendants can avoid liability by obtaining consent or ratification from the 
information owner, then market participants will know that property and related 
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principles are controlling the regime.205  If neither consent nor ratification are 
defenses against insider trading liability, then market participants will know that 
some other government interest has been prioritized. 
Solidifying the role of consent in the doctrine also be helpful in the event that 
the “wrongful use” proposals fail.  Some want the regulation of insider trading 
to focus on fostering some form of “economic efficiency.”  Others want the 
regulation to focus on fostering “fairness.”  Like “wrongful,” all terms 
expressing evaluations can be used to convey dramatically different ideas and 
therefore used to reach substantially different conclusions based on the term’s 
underlying standard of evaluation.  Would a fairness approach aim for economic 
equality or for an economy based on consent?  Would an economic efficiency 
approach chose to use property rules or inalienability rules to protect 
entitlements to information? 
Of course, the proposed reform assumes that law makers would want to make 
the insider trading regime less ambiguous.206 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown that the SEC and federal courts have always premised 
liability for insider trading on the violation of some party’s property rights under 
the classical theory of liability.  Most scholars recognize that the U.S. Supreme 
Court premises liability for insider trading on a breaches of fiduciary duty in 
classical theory cases. Unfortunately, many scholars draw unnecessarily strict 
distinctions between property doctrine and other doctrines—i.e., fraud, fiduciary 
duty, fairness, or disclosure doctrines.   Because they are often searching for the 
one best rationale to explain insider trading doctrine, many have missed the fact 
that the fiduciary duty of loyalty at work in all insider trading cases involves the 
duty to use corporate assets—including confidential business information—for 
the sole benefit of the corporation and its shareholders. Therefore, liability in 
these cases is not premised on property principles or fairness principles or duty 
of loyalty principles. Liability in these cases is premised on property and other 
principles. 
Recognizing the undeniable presence of property principles in insider trading 
doctrine is no reason to treat property as the best rationale for explaining past 
cases or as the best rationale for deciding tough cases in the future.  Yet 
acknowledging property principles does raise doubts about whether officials are 
authorized to impose liability for insider trading.  However, recognizing 
property principles also highlights possible solutions for the confusion in the 
doctrine that many scholars and enforcement officials lament.  At a minimum, 
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reformers interested in eliminating unnecessary ambiguity must clarify the role 
of consent in their reform proposals. 
